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LABOR LAw-LMRA-STRIKE WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH ARBITRATION 
CLAUSE OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AS UNPROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY-A 
disput!;! arose over the working hours and assignment of one of the em-
ployer's truck drivers. The employer suggested to the union that they 
refer the question to an arbitration panel for adjudication. The collective 
bargaining agreement provided that the panel was to be the exclusive 
means of settling all such matters, but the agreement did not contain a 
specific no-strike clause.1 The union refused to arbitrate and ordered a 
strike. Subsequently, the employer discharged twenty of the strikers and 
then refused to reinstate them at the termination of the strike. The union 
claimed that the strike was a protected concerted activity under section 7 
of the amended National Labor Relations Act,2 and that the discharges 
were violations of sections 8 (a) (I) and 8 (a) (3) of the act.3 The National 
Labor Relations Board held that, by striking, the employees had breached 
their collective bargaining agreement, and, therefore, had forfeited any pro-
tection the act might give to such concerted action. W. L Mead, Inc., 113 
N.L.R.B. No. 109, 36 L.R.R.M. 1392 (1955). 
It has been uniformly held in the past that economic strikes are un-
protected concerted activities, where the collectiv~ bargaining agreement 
contains a no-strike clause.4 Absent such a provision, the employees may 
1 Article VIII of the collective bargaining agreement read: "Should any dispute, 
grievance or complaint arise during the life of this agreement which the Business Repre-
sentative fails to adjust, the dispute, grievance or complaint shall be referred to the 
Arbitration Panel, which Panel shall be the exclusive means of adjudicating all matters." 
Principal case at 1393. 
2 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §157. 
3 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (a)(l), 
(3). 
4 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., (7th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 948, 
affd. 306 U.S. 292, 59 S.Ct. 501 (1939); Scullin Steel Co., 65 NL.R.B. 1294 (1946); Joseph 
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strike in furtherance of their disputes with the employer without subject-
ing themselves to discharge.5 But there are exceptions to this rule, other 
than the no-strike clause cases. An employer may discharge employees who 
strike for an unlawful purpose, 6 or for the promotion of interests other 
than their own.7 The principal case has added yet another exception. 
There is authority for the Board's ruling in NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 
where the Supreme Court said that "the Act does not prohibit an effective 
discharge for repudiation by an employe of his agreement, any more than 
it prohibits such discharge for a tort committed against the employer."8 
And in NLRB v. Dorsey Trailers, lnc.,9 it was held that an employer could 
discipline employees who struck without resorting to an agreed upon 
grievance procedure. The question arises, however, whether the Board is 
equating arbitration clauses with no-strike clauses, or is limiting its deci-
sion in the principal case to those arbitration clauses which state that 
arbitration is to be the exclusive means of settling disputes. If all arbitra-
tion clauses and grievance procedure provisions in collective agreements 
are to have the same effect as no-strike clauses, the facts of life of traditional 
collective bargaining will be overlooked. It is normally the union which 
bargains for arbitration clauses, while the employer makes concessions for 
the inclusion of a no-strike clause.10 To hold that a union has waived its 
right to strike under such circumstances is contrary to the probable intent 
of the parties. In the principal case the Board held that the unambiguous 
language of the agreement precluded resort to parol evidence to show that 
the union did not intend the arbitration clause to be a waiver of the right 
to strike.11 However, both logic and the inferences of the Board would 
seem to limit the right of the employer to discharge his striking employees 
to situations where it is agreed that arbitration is to be the only method 
Dyson&: Sons, Inc., 72 N.LR.B. 445 (1947); United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949); 
Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1953); Kraft Foods Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 
1164 (1954). See Daykin, "The No-Strike Clause," 11 UNIV. Pl'IT. L. REv. 13 (1949); 48 
COL. L. REV. 1109 (1948); 63 YALE L. J. 1186 (1954). 
5 NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., (9th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 748. 
6American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944). 
7 See Daykin, "The No-Strike Clause," 11 .UNIV. Pl'IT. L. REv. 13 at 15 (1949). 
s 306 U.S. 332 at 344, 59 S.Ct. 508 (1939). 
9 (5th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 589. In Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 63 N.L.R.B. 1340 
(1945), the discharged employee had refused to follow the production schedule set by 
management, but it is not clear whether the Board allowed the discharge because of his 
insubordinate conduct or because of his failure to follow the regular grievance procedure. 
See also Uni.ted Elastic Corp., note 4 supra. 
10 See Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 478 (1948); 68 HARV. L. REv. 1472 (1955). 
ll Is the language quoted in note 1 supra so unambiguous? Is it not a question of 
whether the union intended the arbitration clause as a waiver of the right to strike or 
whether it merely intended it to be the exclusive means of settling those disputes sub-
mitted for adjustment? 
572 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
of settling disputes.12 The Board does point out that the strike involved 
in the principal case was not the result of an unfair labor practice by the 
employer. Apparently, therefore, the doctrine of NLRB v. Mastro Plastics 
Corp.,18 in which an unfair labor practice strike was held to be protected 
by the act even though the collective bargaining agreement contained a 
specific no-strike clause, would apply to cases where an arbitration clause 
similar to the one in the principal case is involved. It may be noted that 
the instant ruling does not exclusively benefit the employer. It would seem 
only logical that clauses such as that involved in the principal case should 
preclude both strikes and lockouts. 
Hazen v. Hatch, S.Ed. 
l2 See Dorsey Trailers, Inc., note IO supra. Though holding that an agreement as to 
grievance procedures does not act as a waiver of the right to strike, that case indicated 
that, if it was agreed that the procedure was to be the only method of settling disputes, 
the agreement could act as a waiver. 
13 (2d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 462, affd. (U.S. 1956) 76 S.Ct. 349. See Wagner Iron 
Works, 104 N.L.R.B. 445 (1953); 53 CoL. L. REv. 1023 (1953). 
